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The Potential and Limits of the EU’s Promotion of 
Post-Confl ict Transitional Justice:
 A Research Note Based on the Analysis of the Aceh Monitoring Mission *
Kyoko CROSS ??
Abstract
Despite the EU’s contribution to peace-building, some of the ESDP missions dealing with justice 
issues have been seen as inconsistent with the EU’s foreign policy objectives. Incorporation of 
transitional justice perspectives could fill this gap between post-conflict realities and the EU’s core 
values. Focusing on the ESDP mission to Aceh, this paper examines what kind of impact could have 
been made with a strategic adoption of transitional justice. It identifi es and discusses several measures 
that were available to enhance the aspects of transitional justice, despite the fact that the AMM’s role in 
that sphere was limited.
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Introduction
The European Union (EU) is a major contributor to development, crisis management and peace-building at 
the global level. Through the introduction of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), previously 
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) , 1) the EU has been endowed with a new institutional tool 
offering signifi cant operational capabilities in the area of peace-building. 
However, its foreign policy objectives to promote its core values, democracy, the rule of law and human 
rights, have not been adequately translated into actual practice. In particular, the EU’s operations dealing with 
justice issues in post-confl ict societies often have met challenges in recovering the dignity of the victims and 
fulfi lling the demand for justice whilst simultaneously maintaining a fragile peace. Transitional justice (TJ), 
which has emerged as a recognized concept and practice in the fi eld of peace-building and confl ict resolution, 
is not only a relevant approach in the area, but also shares some common purposes with the EU’s ideals. The 
Union has upheld its support for international criminal justice, which is one of the vital elements of TJ; how-
ever, it has not so far incorporated TJ into its crisis management policies holistically as a framework concept 
to be considered. 
This lack of TJ perspectives in the EU crisis management has been pointed out in recent studies. 2) They 
pointed out that, despite the fact the EU has increasingly implemented programs in the relevant area of TJ and 
in some cases referred to the concept explicitly in its policies, these attempts have been scattered and under-
taken in an ad hoc fashion. The previous literature, however, has not discussed how the incorporation of TJ 
concepts could have improved their missions in accordance with their foreign policies objectives.
 This article aims at identifying the features of the EU’s actual operation in the fi eld of TJ. Then it will 
analyse what could have been possible, or not possible, with a strategic adoption of the concept into its opera-
tion, by focusing on the ESDP operation to Aceh, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). TJ is not a special 
kind of justice dispensed through the establishment of an international criminal court or a truth commission; 
rather, it seeks a complementary and holistic approach. Therefore, peace-building operations merged with TJ 
framework could offer more comprehensive ways to redress human rights violations in post-confl ict contexts 
where primary diffi culty is holding those responsible for crimes accountable. The AMM mission is a suitable 
case to consider the EU’s potential and limits to promote TJ in post-confl ict societies by crisis management 
measures, since the AMM had mandates, albeit limited, to deal with justice issues.
This paper proceeds as follows. First, it defi nes TJ and explains its relationship to peace-building and crisis 
management. Then, after overviewing the current EU policies and programs in the area of TJ, it looks into 
 1) With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, the ESDP was renamed the CSDP.
 2) See, for example, Thomas Unger, “The European Union and Transitional Justice,” CLEER Working Papers, Centre for the Law of EU Ex-
ternal Relations (2010); Maria Avello, “European Efforts in Transitional Justice,” FRIDE Working paper 58, (2008).
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the case of the AMM operation, focusing on the fact that the AMM had managed to complete its mission, yet 
lacked strategic TJ perspectives. As a result, neither acknowledgement for victims’ sufferings nor reconcilia-
tion, let alone justice, were achieved when the windows of opportunity to set up a human rights court (HRC) 
and a truth and reconciliation commission (TRC) had been closed. The reintegration program which strategi-
cally encompassed TJ approaches would have contributed to meet certain demands of the people who had 
sought justice and reparation in Aceh. In addition, I will argue that the EU could have made a difference in 
creating gender justice in the Aceh peace process.
1. Transitional justice and peace-building
Transitional justice seeks to address the legacy of systematic and grave human rights abuses, to recognize 
and acknowledge victims, and to contribute to the processes of peace-building and democratization in post-
confl ict societies. TJ mechanisms have been applied as components in a major political transition, from war to 
peace or from authoritarian rule to democracy, in order to establish and sustain peace. Established democratic 
societies, however, may apply TJ measures wishing to address systematic abuse in their past. Thus, the term 
‘transitional justice’ does not merely refer to ‘justice during transition’; rather, it defi nes a holistic response to 
widespread violations of human rights. In this respect, there is no exhaustive list of approaches in TJ initia-
tives, but the main measures include criminal prosecution, truth commissions, reparations, and institutional 
reforms. 3)
In contrast, peace-building covers wider areas than TJ and fundamentally differs in its setting up of struc-
tures and institutions to sustain peace and stability. Although both TJ and peace-building share some of the 
same objectives, peace-building encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and hu-
man rights programs and mechanisms aimed at preventing the outbreak, recurrence or continuation of armed 
confl ict. 4) These attempts are comprehensive and multifaceted, including sustainable development, the eradi-
cation of poverty and inequality, the establishment of accountable and transparent governance, the promotion 
of democracy and the respect of human rights and the rule of law. 5) 
Post-confl ict attempts at TJ can be traced back as far as the Nuremberg and Tokyo war tribunals held after 
World War Ⅱ . These trials were primarily international legal responses designed to address the question of 
accountability for individual violations of international criminal law. However, in response to the changing 
character of the confl icts in the late twentieth century, the concept and the measures of TJ have consequently 
been broadened. Whereas previously the dominant view was characterized by the dichotomy between pros-
 3) The other mechanisms could include gender justice and memorialization efforts. See the website of the International Center for Transitional 
Justice: < http://www.ictj.org>.
 4) UN Security Council, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” UN Doc. S/PRST/2001/5 (20 February 2001). 
 5) Ibid.
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ecution and amnesty, today there is recognition of the wide range of tools and mechanisms available between 
the two extremes. Indeed, the question now is not to ask whether one should address the past or not, but how 
one can achieve diverse TJ goals.
In this way, the current scope of TJ involves the perspectives of strategic peace-building approaches. 6) It 
does not mean, however, the problematic relationship between TJ and peace-building have been solved. In 
fact, there are cases where such approaches do not seem to be incompatible or rather in confl ict. In the situ-
ation of the aftermath of confl icts where peace is fragile or the perpetrators continue to maintain real power, 
establishing and sustaining peace requires maintaining a delicate balance between ending hostility and the 
demand from victims for accountability and justice to redress past abuses. Furthermore, limited resources 
may constrain the choices of priorities of what can be achieved to meet the realities. In many cases, inad-
equate or dysfunctional judiciary systems in immediate post-confl ict situations cannot cope with the number 
of wrongdoers, which consequently creates de facto amnesties for many perpetrators. Nevertheless, the past 
experiences of many societies emerging from mass abuses have shown that prioritizing security to TJ did not 
necessarily guarantee a long-lasting peace.   
On the contrary, the recent development of TJ mechanisms has reinforced the relationship between TJ and 
peace-building. For example, there is a growing recognition that TJ and disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration (DDR) programs can not only coexist in the same framework but can also complement each oth-
er. 7) In many post-confl ict societies, TJ mechanisms have assisted ex-combatants to become reintegrated into 
their local communities. Likewise, reforming or rebuilding public institutions such as security sector reform 
(SSR) can provide pre-conditions for TJ to succeed. 8) Therefore, a program which accommodates both peace-
building and TJ approaches could aim to pursue two goals: the securing of peace and the achieving of justice 
and reconciliation. 
2. The EU’s crisis management policies and its perspectives on transitional justice
2.1. EU’s crisis management policies
The crisis management policies under the EU’s external relations are dealt within the framework of the Com-
mon Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Article 11.1 of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) defi nes one of 
the objectives of CFSP as establishing democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and funda-
 6) For a comprehensive overview and analysis of transitional justice concept and practices, see Ruti Teitel, “Transitional Justice Genealogy,” 
Harvard Human Rights Journal 16 (2000): 69-94; Naomi Roht-Arriaza and Javier Mariezcurrena (eds.), Transitional Justice in the Twenty-
First Century: Beyond Truth versus Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
 7) United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operation, Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (New York: 
DPKO, 2006). For a comprehensive overview and analysis of the relationship between transitional justice and DDR, see Ana Cutter Patel 
et al. (eds.), Disarming the Past: Transitional Justice and Ex-Combatants (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2009). 
 8) See, Laura Davis, “Transitional Justice and Security System Reform,” Initiative for Peacebuilding, Security cluster (2009).
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mental liberties. In order to accomplish these purposes, the EU has varieties of civilian instruments for crisis 
management, ranging from the forms of political co-ordination, including positive measures such as dialogue 
and negative measures such as sanctions, to financial assistance. 9) Article 17.2 of the TEU states that the 
CFSP missions involve Petersberg Tasks, which include humanitarian and rescue interventions, peacekeep-
ing activities and the involvement of combat forces in crisis management. 10) However, the EU had not been 
equipped itself with an operational means to realize these CFSP goals by utilizing a military instrument. 
    The major development needed to wait until the Helsinki European Council in 1999, when the EU un-
dertook to transform its status as a “global civilian power” into a “militarized civilian power” by institutional-
izing the ESDP. 11) The ESDP, later the CSDP, was adopted specifi cally to provide operational crisis prevention 
and management tools with tangible capabilities to the CFSP. The ESDP has been envisaged as a response to 
the EU’s inability to end the ethnic confl icts in the Balkans in the late 1990s. As to capabilities for action, the 
Helsinki summit also reached an agreement on the high-priority goal of establishing of a rapid reaction force 
(RRF) to provide military support in emergencies. 12)  
 One of the characteristics of the EU’s military crisis management is its civil-military cooperation. The 
European Security Strategy (ESS), which was agreed in 2003, stated that today’s conflicts required more 
integrated approaches and emphasized military effi ciency as well as civilian capabilities. 13) Thus, the ESDP, 
which became operational through the fi rst policing mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2003, differenti-
ated itself from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). In fact, most of the crisis management opera-
tions under the ESDP are carried out by civilian missions. 14) In 2004, the EU strengthened this dimension by 
adopting a new Civilian Headline Goal 2008. It added the two further priorities of mission monitoring and 
support to EU special representatives to the four existing elements of civilian management (policing, the rule 
of law, civilian administration, and civil protection). 15) It also noted that the EU should be able to contribute 
to SSR and support DDR processes. These aspects of ESDP missions link closely with TJ processes.
2.2 The EU’s perspectives on transitional justice and its implementation 
TJ is already of great relevance to EU foreign and security policies and is explicitly or implicitly mentioned 
 9) For a comprehensive overview of the EU’s non-military crisis management, see European Commission Confl ict Prevention and Crisis 
Management Unit, “Civilian Instruments for EU Crisis Management” (2003). 
 10) Petersberg tasks were fi rst created by the Western European Union in 1992. In 1997 the tasks were incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty. 
 11) Stavridis argued that militarization of the Union is necessary for the EU to act as a real civilian power to promote democratic principles 
with force. Stelios Stavridis, “Why the ‘Militarising’ of the European Union is Strengthening the Concept of ‘Civilian Power Europe’,’’ 
EUI Working Papers (2001).
 12) The RRF made it possible for 60,000 troops deployable within 60 days for at least one year. 
 13) Council of European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy” (12 Desember 2003).
 14) Maria Raquel Freire, “The European Security and Defence Policy: History, Structures and Capabilities,” in Michael Merlingen and Rasa 
Ostrauskaitė (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, (London: Routledge, 2008) 20. 
 15) Council of the European Union, “Civilian Headline Goal 2008,” 15863/04 (7 December 2004), para 3.
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in the various documents and policies it has established. 16) The EU has upheld its strong support for the es-
tablishment of international criminal justice. Its reliance on formal judicial systems stems from the aspects of 
respecting human rights and the rule of law, some of the EU’s core values. Both fi nancially and politically the 
EU has devoted itself to the fi ght against impunity in cases of grave human rights violations. 
As for political measures, the EU’s strongest commitment to international criminal justice can be found in 
its enlargement policy. 17) For instance, cooperation with the International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) has become a condition for EU membership candidacy for the countries that used to comprise Yu-
goslavia. The EU also has shown strong support for the International Criminal Court (ICC), as the European 
Security Strategy 2008 report has made clear. 18) The Union has an agreement in the area of cooperation and 
assistance with the ICC, which describes the personnel and material contribution available from the EU. 19) In 
addition, as to the crisis management policies, the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are mandated in an 
area that is extremely relevant for TJ. The EUSR for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EUSR for Sudan were 
mandated to cooperate with international courts. 20) The EU has also provided extensive fi nancial support to 
ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, including the ICTY, the International Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Extraor-
dinary Chamber of the Courts of Cambodia, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
With regard to the EU’s development and cooperation policy, the concept of TJ is included as an aspect of 
promoting human rights and democracy, as well as addressing global security and development challenges. 
TJ is perceived as being fundamentally necessary for stability and development. 21) Explicit reference to TJ is 
made to its funding aspects in the Development and Cooperation Policy. 22)
The importance of TJ is identifi ed in the various policies of the Commission as well as in its funding in-
struments. For example, The Instrument for Stability (IfS) was created by the Commission in 2007, with a 
view to intensifying its work in the area of confl ict prevention, crisis management and peace-building. Crisis 
response projects under the IfS explicitly refer to TJ. 23) Its short-term crisis response and preparedness have 
fi nanced a large number of programs regarding the use of mediation, the strengthening of the rule of law, the 
 16) The fi rst document which referred to transitional justice was the EU Presidency statement regarding the UN Secretary-General’s 2004 Re-
port on transitional justice and the rule of law, EU Presidency Statement “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Post-Confl ict Societ-
ies” (6 October 2004). 
 17) Its conditionality includes stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and the protection 
of minorities. Presidency Conclusion, “European Council in Copenhagen 21-22 June 1993,” SN 180/1/93,13.   
 18) It states that “The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen interna-
tional justice and human rights.” European Council, “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy: Providing Security 
in a Changing World” December 2008,12.
 19) Agreement between the International Criminal Court and the European Union on Cooperation and Assistance, ICC-PRES/01-01-06 (28 
April 2006).
 20) The other mandates of EUSR include SSR actions for Afghanistan and DRC. 
 21) The EU’s joint development policy states that its prime objective is to eradicate poverty in line with UN Millennium Goals. As for the 
principle relevant to transitional justice, it describes one of the common principles as “addressing state fragility.” Council of the European 
Union, “The European Consensus on Development,” 14820/05 (22 November 2005).
 22) For example, see Commission of the European Communities, “Towards an EU response to Situations of Fragility: Engaging in Diffi cult 
Environments for Sustainable Development, Stability and Peace”, COM (2007)643 fi nal (25 October 2007), 9.
 23) See, the web site of European Union External Action : < http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/index_en.htm>.
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building of confi dence, the establishing of the interim administrations in order to prevent further confl ict, and 
the supporting of post-confl ict political stability. 24) In addition, the Commission also gives direct fi nancial 
support to truth commissions, such as Morocco’s Fairness and Reconciliation Commission (IER). 
As just described, while crisis management policies involving political and developmental aspects have in-
tegrated the concept of TJ into its programs and operations, the ESDP has not adopted it as a framework con-
cept. However, as more civilian ESDP missions have been conducted, TJ has become more relevant to them. 
In short, although those missions did not make reference to TJ, they have covered the area where peace-
building and TJ were mutually connected. For instances, the Georgia mission (EUJUST THEMIS) was a rule 
of law mission that dealt with judicial reforms, especially criminal justice systems. The Aceh mission covered 
monitoring of the amnesty proceedings and DDR (discussed later in the next section). The Kosovo mission 
(EULEX KOSOVO) and the Iraq mission (EUJUST-LEX) also became involved in judicial and police re-
forms. 
Unlike the EU’s effort to provide fi nancial and political assistance, which tend to be long-term and continu-
ing, these ESDP approaches are designed from the perspective of security issues and are aimed at achieving 
a relatively short-term and quick effect. 25) There has been criticism from some quarters that the lack of a 
coordinated TJ framework has caused disorganized crisis management policies and programs within the EU 
institutions. 26) Moreover, it has been pointed out that there is a “credibility gap” between its foreign policies 
to promote democracy, human rights and the rule of law and its actual practices on the ground. 27) 
In the next section, I turn my attention to the Aceh Monitoring Mission, the fi rst ESDP mission deployed 
to Asia, which lay beyond the EU’s geopolitical sphere of interest, and was also mandated to deal with justice 
issues.
3. The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia
3.1. Brief history of the confl ict and peace process
The Confl ict in Aceh can be traced back to the 1950s, prior to the eruption of an armed insurgency in De-
cember 1976, when the Acehnese separatist group, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM 28)) unilaterally declared 
Acehnese independence. The fi ghting in the region between the Indonesian armed forces and the members of 
GAM intensifi ed when the Indonesian government offi cially declared Aceh a Military Operation Area (DOM) 
 24) The IfS has two components: a short term component concerning crisis response and preparedness, and a long term component in the con-
text of stable condition.
 25) Xymena Kurowska, “The Role of ESDP Operations,” in Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaite (eds.), European Security and Defence 
Policy: An Implementation Perspective (London: Routledge, 2008), 30.
 26) See, note 2.
 27) Laura Davis, “The European Union and Transitional Justice,” Initiative for Peacebuilding Democratisation and Transitional Justice Cluster 
(2010),18.
 28) Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, which was led by Hasan di Tiro.
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in 1989. The Indonesian military launched numerous aggressive operations and counterinsurgency campaigns. 
During the period of DOM, which lasted until 1998, the Indonesian security forces perpetrated the most seri-
ous systematic human rights violations against the Acehnese population. 29) During the years of the confl ict at 
least 33,000 people were killed, and instances of rape and disappearance were widespread. 30)
A number of attempts to end the confl ict were made, however, and the opening of political space for ne-
gotiation was created soon after the aftermath of the devastating tsunami of December 26 in 2004. 31) The 
Helsinki peace process started in January 2005 and was concluded successfully by the signing of the Memo-
randum of Understanding (MoU) between the government of Indonesia and GAM on 15 August the same 
year. The negotiations were facilitated by the former Finnish president Martti Ahtissari and the Finland-based 
NGO Confl ict Management Initiatives. 32) The EU became involved in the Helsinki negotiations upon the ex-
press request from Ahtisaari, who believed that the EU could contribute as a creditable neutral outside body 
to monitor the implementation of the peace process. Although there were political and diplomatic concerns 
expressed by some member states, 33) the decision to deploy a joint mission in collaboration with the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was made. 34)  
3.2. The Aceh Monitoring Mission and its major activities
The AMM was an unarmed civilian ESDP mission. 35) It comprised monitors from the EU, Norway and Swit-
zerland as well as from fi ve ASEAN countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei, the Philippines and Singapore. 
The AMM’s original mandate period was six months from 15 August 2005, after which it was extended three 
times, until 15 December 2006. The AMM’s objective was to assist GAM and the Indonesian government 
with the implementation of the MoU. Its mandate was articulated in the MoU and included the following 
tasks 36):
 29) It should not be overlooked that GAM members also committed violations during this period. Human Rights Watch, “Indonesia: The War 
in Aceh,”  (2001), 8-23.
 30) Bandan Reintegrasi Damai Aceh (BRA) data quoted in Edward Aspinall, “Peace without Justice? The Helsinki Peace Process in Aceh,” 
Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue Report (2008), 8.
 31) Although some commentators explain that the peace process was not the direct result of the natural disaster. See, for example, Kirsten 
Schulze, “Mission Not So Impossible: The Aceh Monitoring Mission and Lessons Learned for the EU,” International Policy Analysis (2007), 
3.
 32) In addition of the role played by Ahtissari, the participation of Juha Christensen, a fellow Finnish citizen, during the peace process worth 
noting. Katri Merikallio, Heiwakouchiku no Shigoto (Tokyo: Akashi shoten, 2007) (Based on David Mitchell’s English translation from the 
original, Katri Merikallio, Making Peace: Ahtisaari and Aceh, Helsinki: WSOY, 2006).
 33) While many member states welcomed an opportunity to expand ESDP missions to Asia and demonstrate its capability as a global security 
player, others showed reluctance because of the political risks to the EU as well as the economic burdens. It was Javier Solana, the High 
Representative for the CFSP, who persuaded the member states and took the initiative to implement the mission. Ibid., 101-161.   
 34) Behind the scenes, Indonesia would not accept the UN involvement because of the recent experience in East Timor. Members of the In-
donesian government insisted that the inclusion of ASEAN would assure local components. Scott Cunliffe, et al., “Negotiating Peace in 
Indonesia: Prospects for Building Peace and Upholding Justice in Maluku and Aceh,” Initiative for Peacebuilding Mediation Cluster (2009), 
18. 
 35) The monitors from ASEAN were almost all assembled from their respective countries’ armed forces. Although the staff from the EU, Nor-
way and Switzerland consisted of both civilians staffs and serving or former military personnel, the mission structure remained predomi-
nantly civilian.  
 36) Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, Helsinki, 17 July 
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• to monitor the demobilization of GAM personnel and the decommissioning of its armaments,
• to monitor the relocation of non-organic 37) military forces and non-organic police personnel,
• to monitor the reintegration of active GAM members into civil society,
• to monitor the human rights situation and provide assistance in this fi eld,
• to monitor the process of legislative change and to rule on disputed amnesty cases,
• to investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of the MoU, and
• to establish and maintain liaison and cooperation with the various parties.
In addition to the list above, the head of the AMM mission had the authority to make binding rulings, after 
consultation with the ruling parties, to resolve the disputes among them related to the MoU. 38) Furthermore, 
although the MoU did not specifi cally articulate its role, the AMM was mandated to monitor the creations of a 
human rights court (HRC) and a truth and reconciliation commission, since the establishment of these institu-
tions was stipulated in the MoU. 39) Among the above-mentioned tasks, the AMM focused in the early stage of 
their mission on the security issues, in particular, monitoring the amnesty for GAM prisoners, the decommis-
sioning of GAM weapons, the redeployment of the Indonesian security forces, and the reintegration of former 
combatants. 
In order to build GAM’s confi dence in the peace process, granting speedy amnesties to GAM prisoners 
was deemed necessary. The amnesty section in the MoU stated that those who had been imprisoned for their 
participation in supporting GAM would be granted amnesty and released within 15 days of the signing of the 
MoU. 40) The AMM kept pressure on the Indonesian government to implement amnesty speedily and com-
pletely, and indeed by August 31 more than 1,400 prisoners had been released. Although there were some 
disputed cases concerning amnesty status, 41) the AMM was, on the whole, successful in this mission, since 
swiftly handled amnesty was believed to have served as a fi rst step towards confi dence building.
The next challenge was the demobilization, disarmament, and decommissioning of GAM fighters. The 
MoU stipulated that GAM would be required to demobilize all its 3,000 troops and decommission 840 fi re-
arms between 15 September and 31 December 2005. The Indonesian government, in turn, would be required 
to withdraw all its non-organic police and military forces from Aceh. The number of organic (locally recruit-
ed) forces to remain would be 14,700 military personnel and 9,100 police personnel. 42)  
2005, article 5. Establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission.
 37) Non-organic means basically opposed to locally recruited and deployed military and police forces.   
 38) If necessary, the head of the mission could refer disputes to Ahtisaari for a fi nal ruling. Ibid., article 6. Dispute Settlement.
 39) Ibid., article 2. Human Rights.
 40) Ibid., article 3. Amnesty.
 41) Amnesty was allowed to GAM prisoners who had committed acts of insurgency; it didn’t include those who had been convicted on crimi-
nal charges. GAM insisted that the amnesty should apply to any crimes carried out on behalf of GAM. See the discussion in the section 3.3., 
and see also Aspinall, op.cit., 19-21. 
 42) Memorandum, op.cit., article 4. Security Arrangement.
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The decommissioning of GAM’s weapons was carried out in four stages. The process started on 15 Sep-
tember 2005 and was completed on 15 December. In parallel with the decommissioning of weapons, the 
Indonesian security forces in Aceh had to be reduced and relocated immediately after each stage had been 
verifi ed by the AMM. Ensuring a successful decommissioning in the fi rst phase was a challenge to the AMM, 
since the completion demonstrated GAM’s commitment to the peace process, which would in turn ease the 
government’s distrust to of GAM. 43) Despite the severe time constraint, all the phases were successfully com-
pleted. The AMM’s role in this parallel decommissioning and redeployment was one of the greatest successes 
achieved by the AMM. Moreover, this decommissioning process had a positive impact on the population of 
Aceh. For the fi rst three months of the mission, the decommissioning activities provided public demonstra-
tions of the destruction of weapons to show clearly that the peace process was moving forward. These events 
received a lot of attention from both the Acehnese and the media. 44)
The AMM was mandated to monitor but not to implement the actual reintegration programs. The MoU 
specifi ed reintegration as follows: former prisoners, ex-combatants, and “civilians who suffered a demon-
strable loss due to the confl ict” would be guaranteed all political, economic and social rights, and their rein-
tegration into society would be facilitated by allowing them to do such things as receiving farm land, fi nding 
employment and receiving adequate social security. GAM combatants also would have the right to seek em-
ployment in the organic police and military forces. 45) 
These reintegration programs were carried out by international organizations, including the International 
Offi ce of Migration (IOM), the local government, and the governmental agency Bandan Reintegrasi Damai 
Aceh (BRA). The reintegration packages to the ex-combatants were released though the local government and 
the regional ex-GAM commanders by means of three rounds of payments. They received Rp. 1 million per 
fi ghter, based on the number of GAM members in their districts that the regional commanders had estimated. 
Both the AMM and the Indonesian government showed dissatisfaction with regard to the way the packages 
were distributed. They wanted to know the names of the individuals to whom the packages were going to be 
delivered. However, the GAM refused to provide the list of names in case the Indonesian government used 
this information in attempts to arrest them. It was not clear whether the list included all the GAM members 
and supporters as well as female fi ghters. Moreover, there were concerns that the distributive system would 
cause favoritism and corruption, since it preserved its command structure from the time of the insurgency. 46) 
 43) The previous peace process (CoHA) collapsed when GAM fi ghters failed to give up their weapons according to the timetable of the CoHA. 
Ross Clarke, Galuh Wandita and Samsidar, “Considering Victims: The Aceh Peace Process from a Transitional Justice Perspective,” Inter-
national Center for Transitional Justice Occasional Paper Series (2008), 10.
 44) In all major towns in Aceh, public demonstration of decommissioning was carried out by the AMM. These events became celebratory gath-
erings with music, dance and theatre. Paul Kirwan, “From European to Global Security Actor: The Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indone-
sia,” in Michael Merlingen and Rasa Ostrauskaitė (eds.), European Security and Defence Policy: An Implementation Perspective, (London: 
Routledge, 2008), 139; Merikallio, op.cit.210-219. 
 45) Memorandum, op.cit.,article 3.2. Reintegration into Society.
 46) The World Bank found that the GAM combatants received less than Rp 1 million, on average between Rp. 170,000 and 260,000. World 
Bank, GAM Reintegration Needs Assessment: Enhancing Peace through Community-level Development Programming (Jakarta: World 
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There was a complaint expressed from the GAM side as well that the reintegration process was proceeding 
too slowly. Indeed, BRA needed to wait until the decommissioning had been completed to launch the pro-
gram. 47) Although there was more criticism aimed at reintegration than amnesty and decommissioning, the 
AMM assured the Indonesian government of its commitment to provide the reintegration packages.  
In summary, while the security issue was dealt with quickly and by and large resulted in success, the politi-
cal issue was stalled and the issues of human rights and justice received less attention from the AMM. The 
next section will overview the TJ situation in Aceh and examines what role the AMM could have played.  
3.3. Transitional justice and the AMM
Despite the agreement on TJ measures between the Indonesian government and GAM, justice has still not 
been delivered and the suffering of victims has continued to this day in Aceh. 48) TJ tools applied in Aceh were 
limited to amnesty and reintegration packages, although it had been promised that a HRC and a TRC would 
be set up.
As mentioned above, amnesty was granted to the political prisoners of GAM. It did not include, however, 
those who had been convicted on criminal charges. In response to this decision, GAM insisted that the am-
nesty should be applied to any crimes carried out on behalf of GAM, by pointing out that in most cases there 
were political motives behind the crimes. 49) The AMM, with authority to make binding rules on the disputed 
amnesty cases, however, preserved an advisory stance, since the amnesty issue was potentially controver-
sial. 50) Another troublesome issue regarding amnesty was that the MoU did not make it clear whether amnesty 
would be granted to the other GAM members who had not been arrested or imprisoned before the MoU but 
who may have committed serious crimes. In addition, the crimes committed by the Indonesian security forces 
were not mentioned at all in the MoU. 51) Moreover, while the Memorandum stipulated who would receive 
amnesty, but it avoided specifying how to deal with past abuses in general. The MoU simply promised that 
“a Human Rights Court will be established for Aceh” 52) and that “a Commission for Truth and Reconciliation 
will be established for Aceh by the Indonesian Commission of Truth and Reconciliation with the task of for-
mulating and determining reconciliation measures”. 53) Indeed, the Law on the Government of Aceh (LoGA), 
adopted in August 2006, set out the establishment of the HRC in Aceh as well as that of the TRC. The AMM 
was tasked to monitor the establishment of these two institutions; however, at the time of writing, they have 
Bank, 2006), 29.
 47) Schulze, op.cit., 7.
 48) “Relatives demand justice for past human rights abuses in Aceh,” The Jakarta Post, Oct.17, 2009.
 49) For example, robbery with an aim to give fi nancial support to the GAM. 
 50) Kirwan, op.cit., 138.
 51) In the MoU, amnesty was granted in a one-sided way and applied unequally to the warring parties. During the negotiations, Indonesia did 
not seek amnesty for its armed forces., Scott Cunliffe, et al., Ibid. 20.
 52) Memorandum, op.cit., article 2.2.
 53) Ibid., article 2.3.
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still not been set up. For one thing, the LoGA limited the jurisdiction of the Aceh HRT to future cases, not 
retroactively to the violations committed during the confl ict. 54) This means that, even if the Aceh HRC were 
to be established, it would not be allowed to deal with the crimes carried out prior to 15 August 2005. For 
another, there has been little movement to try those responsible in the former military and police forces in 
the domestic courts, although other HRCs could have been used for this purpose. 55) As for the establishment 
of a TRC, both the MoU and the LoGA stated that the Aceh TRC should be created within the framework 
of the national TRC law. However, the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled out the decision to revoke this 
law in 2006. The Court found the provision of the national TRC law was in contradiction to Indonesia’s 1945 
Constitution. 56) Consequently, past abuses, including serious crimes, would go largely unpunished and remain 
unaccountable. As a result, a large justice vacuum has been created, and serious crimes committed either by 
members of GAM or the Indonesian security forces which had not been addressed before the MoU have re-
ceived de facto amnesty.
Furthermore, the lack of any judicial or truth-seeking mechanisms resulted in the marginalisation of the 
victims of the confl ict from the reintegration processes. According to article 3.2 of the MoU, any “affected 
civilian” would be entitled to receive compensatory economic assistance in the form of land, employment, or 
social security for those unable to work. However, without a justice system or a truth commission, defi ning 
and identifying “affected civilians” has proved very diffi cult, and delivering payments to individual victims 
to meet their needs has consequently been problematic. 57) Thus, the BRA has sought to integrate assistance to 
confl ict victims with community-based development approaches rather than individual reparations. 58) This has 
generated the feeling of injustice among the victims towards the former combatants who have received rein-
tegration packages. 59) In addition, the diyat payments, which were made by the government to the families of 
people who had been killed or disappeared during the confl ict, caused other grievances. 60) Whilst compensa-
tion is important, providing it without acknowledgment of the harm victims suffered runs the risk of turning 
it into ‘blood money’. 61) In many cases, the victims have never had any chance to know the truth about what 
had happened to their loved ones. By the same token, reintegration benefi ts without criminal justice could 
 54) Clarke et al., op.cit., 13. 
 55) In theory, ad hoc HRCs can try serious human rights crimes prior 2000. At least serious crimes committed after 2000 can be tried in a regu-
lar HRC. One in Megan has a jurisdiction over Aceh, but so far they have not heard a single case about Aceh.       
 56) The Court took this decision since the law 27/2004 had room to provide amnesty for gross human rights abuses. Aspinall, op.cit., 29.
 57) Ibid., 23.
 58) The BRA has adapted the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP), which was developed by the World Bank. Individual villages were 
allocated different sums of money, depending on the size and the intensity of the confl ict. However, there were some criticisms that the 
programs were not aimed directly at the confl ict victims. Ibid., 23-24.
 59) Clarke et al., op.cit., 23.
 60) The government diyat program was initiated in late 2002. The deputy governor then in Aceh introduced diyat program which was derived 
both from classic Islamic legal sources and from the various practices of Middle Eastern countries. See, Aspinall, op.cit., 25-26.
 61) In tradition, it was up to the family of the victims to decide whether to accept the diyat payment from the family of perpetrator instead of 
his or her execution. Thus, the government program interpreted that those who have accepted diyat have already forgiven perpetrators. 
However, it does not mean the government accepted responsibility. For criticisms towards the diyat, see, ibid.
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mean that no individual or institution, including the state, takes ultimate responsibility.
Accordingly, while the AMM was a relative success in the context of accomplishing most of its mandates 
without delay, in terms of TJ the AMM’s performance was not adequate at all. Behind this lay the reluctance 
of the Helsinki peace process to deal with the justice agenda. The peace agreement strategically avoided polit-
ical issues, since doing so could have undermined the peace process all together.  62) As a result, the references 
regarding justice in the MoU were expressed in vague terms. Thus the AMM, taking the MoU as its road map, 
maintained a narrow focus on security issues and did not comprehensively engage in the justice issue. 63) In 
fact, justice and human rights were the most problematic areas of the AMM mission, since it needed to delve 
deeply into Indonesian domestic policies and legislation. Indonesia is neither a failed state nor a weak state 
which could submit to international intervention. In particular, at the time of the AMM’s operation, Indonesia 
was quite sensitive about international intervention in the realm of domestic human rights issue because of 
its recent experiences in East Timor. Therefore, even if it had integrated the concept of TJ into its operation 
policy, what the AMM could have done to infl uence the government of Indonesia to bring justice to the for-
mer senior military and security offi cers would naturally have been severely limited. The AMM thus had little 
option other than to persuade the government by increasing dialogue on this matter, since its mandate was, af-
ter all, to monitor the government and GAM to implement the principles agreed upon in the MoU. The AMM 
played a small role in delivering justice; nevertheless, this does not necessarily mean there was nothing that 
the AMM could have done to contribute towards the establishment of TJ in Aceh. Transitional justice could 
be achieved in a comprehensive way when it is not possible to implement prime justice and accountability 
measures.
To begin with, the AMM did not respond to the voices of victims by linking reintegration to a truth-telling 
process. Reintegration programs are generally used to encourage the acceptance of returning ex-combatants 
to their local communities. However, in the context of the Acehnese confl ict, GAM fi ghters did not leave their 
villages completely; in reality, therefore, they did not need to be reintegrated. 64) Instead, attention should have 
been paid more to the victims and to the people who were made most economically vulnerable by the con-
fl ict. In Aceh almost all the population was severely affected by the hostilities and the distinction between a 
combatant and a sympathizer was diffi cult to make. Thus, the AMM needed to persuade GAM to comply with 
the requirement to submit names of its ex-combatants so that the reintegration program could become more 
transparent and more inclusive. For this reason, cooperation between the AMM and the EU Commission in 
 62) The GAM delegates initially insisted on the accountability of the past crimes, but Ahtisaari encouraged them to focus on the future. Meri-
kallio, op.cit., 72-75.
 63) In fact, some scholars point out that the AMM’s success was partly brought precisely by its lack of focus on implementing human rights 
elements. Schulze, op.cit.
 64) Patrick Barron, “Getting Reintegration Back on Track: Problems in Aceh and Priorities for Moving Forward,” a paper presented at the con-
ference “The Peace Process in Aceh: The Reminders of Violence and the Future Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam,” at Harvard University, Oct. 
24-27, 2007, 2-3.
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order to foster a reintegration program with some truth-telling or fact-fi nding mechanism would be useful. 
The Commission, which has been funding reintegration in Aceh, could thus offer good expertise and informa-
tion. 65) The data collected might have been utilized in future prosecutions.
Secondly, the AMM failed to take gender justice into account by encouraging more women to participate 
in the peace process. 66) Among the 3000 former GAM combatants to receive reintegration packages, it is 
believed that not a single woman has been included. 67) In addition, various institutions have been established 
to facilitate the peace process since the sign of MoU, but they employed only a few women. 68) For example, 
out of the 43 members of BRA, only three were women. Empowering women’s participation would have 
enhanced the movement to address violations perpetrated towards women such as rape. 69) This approach is 
required now by the gender-aware confl ict resolution mandated by Security Council resolution 1325, which 
was implemented into ESDP missions in 2005. 70)
Lastly, the AMM could have spread the concept of TJ and technique by engaging more widely with local 
civil groups. 71) Ultimately, it was a local civil society that took the initiative to pursue justice after the AMM 
mission had completed. The creation of a discursive space for women and local civil societies to participate in 
the peace process as well as to work together with TJ experts was necessary. The AMM missed the chance to 
have greater impact on the future TJ by raising awareness of the Acehnese right for justice, truth and repara-
tion. 
Conclusion
This paper has attempted to identify the features of the ESDP operation in the fi eld of TJ and to analyse what 
would be the EU’s potential as well as its limits on promoting TJ, with a strategic adoption of the concept into 
its ESDP operation. As the analysis of the AMM mission has shown, whilst the AMM successfully oversaw 
the completion of its missions, it failed to fulfi ll the demand for justice and the protection of victims’ human 
rights. However, this failure was not the direct result of any lack of TJ perspectives. In fact, as we have seen, 
the AMM was limited by the terms of the MoU to a very narrow role. Human rights was a very sensitive issue 
in Indonesia, and the AMM could not intervene directly in domestic issues, in case such action derailed the 
peace process altogether. TJ approaches, however, are interconnected with many crisis management policies, 
 65) The EU Commission funded 4 million Euros to the IOM for a reintegration program for amnestied prisoners and former combatants. See, 
European Union @ United Nations,  http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/es/article_5008_es.htm
 66) There was criticism of the disproportionately small participation of women in the peace process. See, Crisis Management Initiatives, “Aceh 
Peace Process: Involvement of Women,” (Helsinki: CMI, 2006). 
 67) Suraiya Kamaruzzaman, “Agents for Change: the Roles of Women in Aceh’s Peace Process,” Accord 20 (2008), 71.
 68) Ibid.
 69) Rape was widely committed during the confl ict but remain signifi cantly under-reported in offi cial document.
 70) Council of European Union, “Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the Context of ESDP,” 11932/2/05 REV 2 (29 September 2005).
 71) The AMM was criticized for not engaging more widely with civil groups. Patrick Barron and Adam Burke, Supporting Peace in Aceh: De-
velopment Agencies and International Involvement (Washington D.C.: East-West Center, 2008), 28-29.
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and thus well-thought of crisis management programs could open windows to TJ when conventional justice 
mechanisms are not available. Hence, a crisis management approaches that integrates TJ into its programs 
could be very forward-looking in preparing future justice and reconciliation mechanisms.
In conclusion, it is fair to assert that in order to fulfi ll its foreign policy objectives, the EU needs in future to 
develop a strategic approach to the ESDP to accommodate both peace and justice. TJ can offer a new means 
to oversee its crisis management policies in a comprehensive and effective way to fi ll the gap between the 
post-confl ict realities and the EU’s core humanitarian values. The concept could add future strategies to help 
bridge the gap between its objectives in the framework of the CFSP and the actual realization of its remit on 
the ground. The EU’s normative role would push it to play a greater security player in the globalized world.
